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neither the individual nor the social creation of meaning, but rather adventurous exploration in the discovery
of meaning. His approach, like Russell's, is individualistic and, like Dewey's, total rather than partial or limited.
He drew both on the English analytical interest in psychology and sociology, while at the same time
maintaining his own concern for the latest scientific developments. But, in contradistinction to the interest of
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But in anticipating the direction of the transformations 
in philosophy to be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and 
experimental logic, I do not profess to speak for any save 
those who yield themselves consciously or unconsciously to 
this logic. No one can fairly deny that at present there are 
two effects of the Darwinian mode of thinking. On the one 
hand, there are making many sincere and vital efforts to 
revise our traditional philosophic conceptions in accordance 
with its demands. On the other hand, there is as definitely 
a recrudescence of absolutistic philosophies; an assertion 
of a type of philosophic knowing distinct from that of the 
sciences, one which opens to us another kind of reality from 
that to which the sciences give access; an appeal through 
experience to something that essentially goes beyond exper­
ience. This reaction affects popular creeds and religious 
movements as well as technical philosophies. The very con­
quest of the biological sciences by the new ideas has led 
many to proclaim an explicit and rigid separation of philo­
sophy from science. 
Old ideas give way slowly; for they are more than abstract 
logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions, 
deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. More­
over, the conviction persists — though history shows it to be 
a hallucination — that all the questions that the human mind 
has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the 
alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in 
fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer aban­
donment of questions together with both of the alternatives 
they assume — an abandonment that results from their decreasing 
vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not solve 
them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by dis­
appearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to 
the changed attitude of endeavor and preference take their place. 
Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of 
old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new 
intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific 
revolution that found its climax in the "Origin of Species."* 
3. Whitehead's Philosophical Synthesis 
In Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) we meet a philosopher 
who was born an Englishman and died an American, and whose thought" 
combined the major recent philosophical contributions of both 
countries in a radically new and startling metaphysical synthesis. 
Unlike both Dewey and Russell, he sees in philosophy neither the 
* John Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other 
Essays in Contemporary ThougTfE (New YorE: Henry Holt and Company, 
1910), pp. 1-19 Used with permission. 
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individual nor the social creation of meaning, but rather advent­
urous exploration in the discovery of meaning. His approach, like 
Russell's, is individualistic and, like Dewey's, total rather than 
partial or limited. He drew both on the English analytical interest 
in psychology and sociology, while at the same time maintaining 
his own concern for the latest scientific developments. But, in 
contradistinction to the interest of Russell and Dewey in method, 
his philosophy was continually metaphysical. 
Whitehead was born into a middle-class background of English 
teachers and clergymen. He began his education and career at Cam­
bridge University, where he attained considerable fame for his 
investigations into the bases for mathematics and geometry. So 
similar were his conclusions to those of his most famous pupil 
that they were able to collaborate on the Principia Mathematica 
(1910-1913). But during and after World War I the two men drew 
apart as their' attitudes toward war and philosophy began to 
differ markedly. Russell, content to remain primarily the analyst, 
applied his criticism to a wide variety of topics and interests. 
Whitehead, on the other hand, sought to develop out of the same 
analysis some basis for a positive metaphysical construction. 
Russell insisted that the newer logic should have the last word 
in what we can know, while he was equally insistent that there 
was much more to know. Whitehead insisted that, necessary as 
logic was, it should never have the last word, that supplementing 
it with intuition and imagination man should attempt to encompass 
all there was to be known. Ignoring the charge of psychologism 
which Russell leveled at all who were interested in how we know. 
Whitehead was to develop out of his epistemology a total meta­
physics which he preferred to call the philosophy of organism. 
In 1910 Whitehead left Cambridge, despite the fact that he 
had no new academic position. After a year, during which he wrote 
An Introduction to Mathematics (1911), he went to the University 
Allege, London XT911-1924). Here his thought developed in two 
major directions. First, he was soon drawn into the problems of 
education for an industrial society. As a result The Aims of Edu-
cation (1916) made it appearance. Second, his interest in Togic 
and mathematics was brought to focus on the philosophy of science, 
and resulted in those books which are most respected by scientists: 
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge (1919), 
TEe Concept"~of Nature (1920) , and The Principle of Relativity (1922) . 
In 1924, at the retirement age of sixty-three. Whitehead 
left London and was appointed professor of philosophy at Harvard 
University, a post which he held until 1936. Here in the United 
States, under the impact of the thought of such men as William 
James and John Dewey, and in a society attempting to weld together 
people of various racial stocks and cultural backgrounds, his 
thought took on still further dimensions. An interest in broadly 
sociological and cultural ideas developed, and his metaphysical 
interests were given free play. One of the results of these interests 
was the production of some of his books which are held in highest regard 
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by many philosophers: Science and the Modern World (1925), Religion 
^n the Making (1926), Process and Reality (the Gifford Lecture") 
published in 1929), Adventures of Ideas (1933), and Modes of 
Thought (1938). Throughout his~Tong career, which did not~end 
with retirement, he brought together the nineteenth century's 
interests in change and culture with the twentieth's interest in 
analysis and precision, for the purpose of a broader and deeper 
knowing and understanding. 
Knowing, for Whitehead, came to be interpreted as an organic 
relation between subject and object. But his interpretation was 
to raise seriously the question of the nature of the two terms 
which were thus related in the process of knowing. Older meta­
physics had foundered on this problem because it had insisted that 
there was a self-identical subject, called the self, and a simil­
arly self-identical object, called a thing. The older philosophies 
were torn between two interpretations of the knowing relationship, 
neither of which was satisfactory. If the relationship were 
internal, as in Hegel, the result was the reduction of the indivi­
dual to the mere sum of his relations. If the relationship were 
external, as in Kant, the result was the loss of any bridge be­
tween the self and the object such as could afford real knowledge. 
Such interpretations, argued Whitehead, offered no solution, and 
further were in agreement neither with the findings of recent 
physics nor new ideas of relativity. Recent physics had exchanged 
the Newtonian categories of matter, space, and time for the vastly 
different categories of energy and space-time continuum. And a 
more accurate description of the knowing relationship interpreted 
it as a continuing process rather than a series of discrete 
experiences. Contemporary relativity (for which he had developed 
his own theory) made it clear that everything was related to every­
thing else, and not that each knowing experience was relative 
only to some static and enduring self. The whole knowing process 
was thus to be seen as an organic one, rather than a mechanical 
one. And as a result of these conclusions, Whitehead was able to 
produce a totally new metaphysics based on process rather than 
changeless entities. 
Whitehead maintained continuing interest in language. Ordinary 
language he sees as both helpful and harmful. It helps in that 
it passes on to succeeding generations the insights of the past, 
but it is also harmful because at the same time it is passing on 
stereotypes which are capable of arresting the future development 
of thinking. He is therefore not willing to use ordinary language 
as his final court of appeal, after the manner of G. E. Moore. 
Rather, and in this Whitehead sides with Russell, man must be free 
to develop new words for new ideas. But, and here he parts company 
with Russell, these new words and categories must include not 
only the a priori mathematical and logical definitions, but the 
broadest generalizations of science and the contributions of 
social imagination and intuition as well. 
The emphasis on process did not mean for Whitehead that every-
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thing was to be dissolved by or in change — such a conclusion 
would mean the denial of the very possibility of knowing at all. 
There are permanent elements within the process which make know­
ing possible. But their permanence is not to be found in the 
nature of the stuff, material or spiritual, of which things are 
made. Rather their permanence is to be found in a continuity of 
direction or a persistence of aim. This alone is able to produce 
an individual thing without denying it the property of change 
which alone makes life possible. Thus Whitehead refers to New­
ton's idea of nature as "dead," and asserts that a "dead" nature 
gives no reasons. Since reasons are "aims at value," it is only 
a living nature which can offer reasons to the knower. Nature is 
thus viewed as an organism which alone can unite those two major 
factors of process and permanence which represent the most deep-
seated demands of the human being. 
In order'to attain the greatest happiness and enjoyment man 
must, therefore, entertain the highest and most inclusive ideals 
possible. "No period of history," Whitehead wrote, "has ever 
been great or ever can be that does not act on some sort of high, 
idealistic motives, and idealism in our own time has been shoved 
aside, and we are paying the price for it." Grouped together, 
these ideals, which include not only the traditional truth, 
beauty, and goodness, but also the added ideals of peace and 
adventure, are called God. This God is not the Creator God of 
the Christian tradition, but rather that factor which represents 
the lure of the entire universe toward a higher, broader, deeper, 
and more inclusive vision, a vision which goes beyond science, 
and which would include both the tragedy and the joy of human 
existence. It is in adventuring after these ideals that White­
head sees man as attaining his highest happiness. 
The selection chosen from Whitehead's writings, entitled 
"The Aim of Philosophy^" makes but little attempt to explain 
his new and special vocabulary. Rather, it was a short talk given 
to philosophy students at Harvard and Radcliffe, in 1935, shortly 
before his retirement. In it can be caught some of his general 
attitude toward philosophy and some appreciation of his interpre­
tation of its role in the contemporary search for meaning. 
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